Private School Not Always a Section 7 Expense

In Desprez v Bertrand, 2025 ABKB 341, Justice McLeod ruled that the expense of private school tuition for the parties’ six-year-old did not qualify as reasonable or necessary under section 7 and therefore refused the mother’s request that the father share that cost. This decision stood despite an earlier agreement between the parents for their child’s enrollment in private school.

The parents had entered into a consent order resolving both back-dated and ongoing child support obligations. Before that order was finalized, they had agreed that the child would attend private school, and the father had been contributing toward tuition and other associated expenses. However, the school’s fees were slated to rise sharply once a government subsidy lapsed. Although the father expressed general support for private schooling, he maintained that he could not assume half of the increased tuition on top of the child support payments already established by the consent order.

Both parents earned roughly $145,000 annually, but Justice McLeod accepted the father’s testimony that his earnings might fall, given that a substantial portion derived from overtime work.

In assessing the claim, Justice McLeod examined the Guideline authorities on “reasonableness” and “necessity” under section 7, observing that “necessity” encompasses not only expenses essential to a child’s basic needs but also costs appropriate to the child’s standard of living and requirements at the relevant time.

Justice McLeod concluded that the child had no special needs and that, notwithstanding the private school’s strong reputation, the same educational benefits could be obtained at considerably lower expense in the public system. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that transferring to a public school would cause the child any undue disruption.